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Abstract 
There is now enough plastic in the world to wrap the entire planet. Plastic is now so pervasive scientists 
are saying that it is a new geological marker. And no part of the planet has been more affected by the 
spread of plastic waste than the ocean. Eventually the things we dispose of will dispose of us. We are 
suffocating the planet in our toxic waste. The ocean, as vast as it is, has somehow slipped from view-it is 
used as a dumping ground for all kinds of waste, and it is steadily dying, but no-one seems able to raise a 
hand to help it. In part this is a problem of sovereignty. All nations claim their piece of the ocean, but none 
own it outright. And now that it is in trouble we must ask who is responsible for fixing it? Global warming 
is a problem of rubbish-it is caused by the by-products of what we do in our daily lives. We generally 
expect others to change so we can stay the same, but what would get us to change everything, including 
ourselves? In critical theory there are essentially only two answers to this question: we either do what we 
know we must (Kant's categorical imperative is the sine qua non of this position); or we do what we feel 
we must (Bennett's vital materialism is in many ways the sine qua non of this position). Adherents to the 
latter view of things describe it as either embodied or material and they castigate adherents of the 
categorical view for being either disembodied or immaterial. The limits of the former are that it is idealist 
and, in being so, implicitly tyrannical because the set of things we must do are not defined or decided 
upon by ourselves. They are instead imposed from the outside and often without any awareness of or 
interest in history or indeed culture. 
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There is now enough plastic in the world to wrap the entire planet.  Plastic  
is now so pervasive scientists are saying that it is a new geological marker.  And  
no part of the planet has been more affected by the spread of plastic waste 
than the ocean.  Eventually the things we dispose of will dispose of us.  We are  
suffocating the planet in our toxic waste.  The ocean, as vast as it is, has somehow  
slipped from view—it is used as a dumping ground for all kinds of waste, and  
it is steadily dying, but no-one seems able to raise a hand to help it.  In part 
this is a problem of sovereignty.  All nations claim their piece of the ocean, 
but none own it outright.  And now that it is in trouble we must ask who is  
responsible for fixing it?  Global warming is a problem of rubbish—it is caused  
by the by-products of what we do in our daily lives.  We generally expect others  
to change so we can stay the same, but what would get us to change everything,  
including ourselves?  In critical theory there are essentially only two answers to  
this question: we either do what we know we must (Kant’s categorical imper- 
ative is the sine qua non of this position); or we do what we feel we must (Bennett’s  
vital materialism is in many ways the sine qua non of this position).  Adherents  
to the latter view of things describe it as either embodied or material and they 
castigate adherents of the categorical view for being either disembodied or im- 
material.  The limits of the former are that it is idealist and, in being so, implicitly  
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tyrannical because the set of things we must do are not defined or decided upon  
by ourselves.  They are instead imposed from the outside and often without 
any awareness of or interest in history or indeed culture.
Keywords: assemblage, ocean, matter, plastic, waste, pollution
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There is now enough plastic in the world to wrap the entire planet.  Since the 
end of WW2 five billion tonnes of plastic has been produced and it is expected 
that by the end of this century the total output will exceed 30 billion tonnes. 
Plastic is now so pervasive scientists are saying that it is a new geological marker. 
They used to look at gas rings in the ice; henceforth they’ll look for layers of pla- 
stic.  And no part of the planet has been more deeply affected by the spread of plastic 
waste than the ocean (McKie).  The ocean is so vast many people seem to think there 
is room enough in it, like the oubliettes of ancient times, for all the toxic things we 
want to forget we ever manufactured or needed.  Today it is used as a dumping 
ground for all kinds of waste, and it is steadily dying, but no one seems able to 
raise a hand to help it.  In part this is a problem of sovereignty.  All nations claim 
their piece of the ocean, but none own it outright, so none are willing to take 
on the responsibility of saving the ocean.
There can be few messier or more urgent problems facing the world today 
than the state of its oceans.  Eventually the things we dispose of will dispose of us. 
We are suffocating the living creatures on this planet with our toxic waste.  Global 
warming is itself a problem of rubbish—it is caused by the by-products of what 
we do in our daily lives.  How urgent is the situation?  Callum Roberts provides 
some context: “The last two hundred years have seen marine habitats wiped out 
or transformed beyond recognition.  And with an ever-accelerating tide of human 
impact, the oceans have changed more in the last thirty years than in all of hu-
man history before it.”  Needless to say that change has been anything but bene- 
ficial.  Indeed, it has been nothing short of devastating, and the carnage continues. 
“In most places, the oceans have lost upwards of 75 percent of their megafauna— 
large animals such as whales, dolphins, sharks, rays and turtles—as fishing and hunt- 
ing has spread in waves across the face of the planet.”  For some species numbers 
are down by as much as 99 percent and there are dozens more that have literally 
disappeared (3).  And that doesn’t even begin to cover the full extent of the de- 
struction.  One must also mention algal and jellyfish blooms, acidification, 
coral bleaching, the appearance and spread of deoxygenated “dead zones,” rising 
water temperatures, and the incredible volume of biological and non-biological 
pollutants and rubbish that has been pumped into the ocean without a second 
thought for either the present or the future.  “Yet outside the world of marine 
science, this global catastrophe pass[es] largely unseen and unremarked” (2).
One might say the same of that other global catastrophe that very few people 
in power want to see, but the sad fact is the destruction of the ocean is only partly 
attributable to climate change.  This is not to say climate change isn’t wreaking 
havoc on life beneath the world’s blue expanses, because it most certainly is, and 
its effects have been amply documented.  But long before scientists noticed that 
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the earth’s atmosphere was heating up, the ocean’s biomass was already failing ra- 
pidly due to a deadly combination of chronic overfishing and unchecked pollution. 
If we focus on climate change and ignore overfishing and pollution, it will be dis- 
astrous for the future of the ocean because, even if we were to attenuate or better yet 
halt climate change, the ocean would still be in desperate need of our help.  Fish 
stocks have fallen so dramatically that in many cases they will never recover, re-
gardless of what we do.  Indeed, in most cases it has reached the point where only 
a long-term moratorium on fishing would be sufficient to begin to reverse the ef- 
fects of population decline.  And even then, that would only work in places where 
the ocean hasn’t been rendered toxic either by the presence of pollution or an over- 
population of predators such as jellyfish, which under bloom conditions can exter- 
minate all other lifeforms in their vicinity as they have done in the Black Sea.
The islands of rubbish floating in the oceans today have gotten so outsized they 
are literally beyond remedy.  If we do not address these issues on a planet-wide basis, 
then irrespective of what we do on the climate change front the ocean will die.  It 
is no exaggeration, then, to say that today the ocean needs us, particularly when 
it comes to the already insurmountable, but steadily worsening, problem of rubbish, 
where the scale of the problem has grown so large it is difficult to comprehend, much 
less imagine, a workable solution.  The gyre in the north-east Pacific is now known 
as the Great Eastern Garbage Patch.  It has become an enormous meshwork of 
flotsam—largely plastic rubbish—the size of Texas.  “Just like the mats of floating 
seaweed that so amazed the sailors of old, great rafts of plastic, fishing line, nets, 
ropes and a thousand and one other bits of junk have accumulated within the 
gyres” (Roberts 144).  This cesspool of waste spells death to the marine creatures 
forced to try to live in its midst.  Leatherback turtles and Laysan albatross, to name 
but two species, are steadily vanishing from the earth because they cannot distin- 
guish between inedible plastic and nutritious food.
Closer to shore, the problem is just as great, and though this land-based rub- 
bish is undoubtedly more visible than the rubbish-choked gyres in the middle of 
the Pacific, it does not appear to have attracted any more attention, much less ur- 
gency of action.  Again, the scale of the problem is difficult to comprehend.  For 
example, a 2001 survey of the beaches in California’s Orange County estimated 
that there were 150,000 items of visible rubbish for every kilometre of beach.  For 
the county as a whole this amounted to over 100 million pieces of rubbish.  But 
this is barely the tip of the iceberg because most plastic rubbish is too small to be 
seen by the naked eye.  Sometimes referred to as mermaid’s tears, billions upon 
billions of micro-sized pieces of plastic, the raw materials of the plastics industry, 
are washed into the ocean every day, some remaining at the surface, forming “strange 
attractors” for all the toxic scum floating elsewhere in the ocean, some falling to the 
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bottom, some just drifting endlessly.1  Microplastic is in many ways an even more 
pernicious problem than the regular-sized plastic rubbish problem because it means 
toxins are entering the eco-system at the bottom of the food chain which means, as 
Rachel Carson instructed us half a century ago, its effects are multiplied exponen- 
tially at every step up the food chain.  By the time it gets to humans it has become 
many times more toxic and deadly (50-60).
We are often told that the problem with plastic rubbish, in particular, is that 
it takes thousands of years to degrade, the implication being that plastics might be 
tolerable if they were to break down more rapidly.  But it turns out this isn’t true. 
Plastic does break down, and much faster than we’ve been given to expect, parti-
cularly in seawater, and when it does it amplifies the problem of ocean-borne rub- 
bish by serving as a kind of magnet for toxins.  The particles of biodegrading and 
fragmenting plastic
are not just harmless roughage.  They concentrate toxic compounds on their surfaces,  
sometimes to levels a million times or more above concentrations in the seawater around  
them […].  In one Japanese experiment, polystyrene beads soaked in seawater for several  
days picked up PCBs.  When they break down, plastic particles release toxic compounds  
like flame retardants, styrene, phthalates and bisphenol A into the sea.  (Roberts 147)
The latter is used to coat the inside of cans used for food, but has been banned 
in most first world countries because it has been discovered to have endocrine-
disrupting properties.  Marine life eats this plastic and then at some point enters 
our food chain, thus completing the vicious circle of toxins out and toxins in.
To address any of these problems we need to—as Naomi Klein puts it—change 
everything.2  Neither climate change nor the death of the ocean can be averted by in- 
dividuals—not even millions of individuals—shopping for “sustainable” commodities 
and being conscientious about reducing packaging and recycling the recyclables. 
We’re not going to be able to shop our way out of this slow-motion catastrophe. 
We need to change the way we think about what life means—we need to ask our- 
selves what we owe the planet and act accordingly.  If we take seriously the imminent 
threats to life on earth, then we are called to change our understanding of how our 
lives on this planet can and should be lived.  This goes beyond individual life- 
style choices.  It has to do with the premise and structure of the global economy 
and the imperative to grow, to put profit before everything else, including life on earth. 
As Klein puts it, everywhere on earth our economic system, contemporary capitalism, 
1 “An alarming new twist is that most cosmetics manufacturers now add sub-millimetre-sized plastic 
granules to hand lotions and face creams.  They are too small to be filtered out by sewage works, and most 
particles are washed to sea, where they can be ingested by tiny plankton, which mistake them for food 
like copepods or fish eggs” (Roberts 148).
2 From the title of Klein’s book, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate.
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is at war with the planet.  Unfortunately, it seems Fredric Jameson was correct in 
quipping that we find it easier to imagine the end of the earth than the end of ca- 
pitalism because we seem to prefer to do nothing to change the way things are.
That failure of imagination may well be the death of us all as a species.  And 
Jameson is doubtless correct in insisting that failure of the imagination is one of 
the more pernicious ills blighting contemporary society.  We seem to be incapable 
of imagining something better than what we have, except in the highly localised 
sense of a new commodity.  The irony of this is that our imagination is impeded 
by an unwillingness to give up on the world we have—we are deeply attached to 
all the apparently “good” things capitalism has to offer, from smart phones to re-
frigerators and cars.  It isn’t hard to understand why we should be so attached to 
these things capitalism has provided; they offer a great many highly desirable af- 
fordances.  They have enabled us to create a world in which the needs and especially 
the comforts and conveniences of individuals are uppermost.  It is against this that 
we have to measure our demands on individuals to change their behaviour—when 
even separating one’s own trash is made to seem like too much of an ask, then 
what hope does the planet have?
Thus, there is probably no more important critical and political question 
today than this: What prompts us to act?  What would get us to change everything, 
including ourselves?  In critical theory there are essentially only two answers to this 
question: (1) we either do what we know we must (Kant’s categorical imperative 
is the sine qua non of this position); or (2) we do what we feel we must (Bennett’s 
vital materialism is in many ways the sine qua non of this position).  Adherents 
to the latter view of things describe it as either embodied or material and they 
castigate adherents of the categorical view for being either disembodied or imma-
terial.  The limits of the former are that it is idealist and, in being so, implicitly 
tyrannical because the set of things we must do are not defined or decided upon by 
us.  They are instead imposed from the outside and often without any awareness 
of or interest in history or indeed culture.  Not only that, imposed rules are not 
rules that we necessarily feel ought to be heeded, so they do not necessarily compel 
action.  They are dry and abstract and often feel outdated and in need of revision, 
so we ignore them (Hawkins 1-18).
Against the categorical imperative, materialism in its many guises has tried to 
elaborate a theory of ethics built on the idea that “we” respond to things and that 
our response to things contains the seeds of a new way of thinking about contem- 
porary life.  This is the position of Gay Hawkins in The Ethics of Waste.  This po-
sition unsettles me, however, because I cannot bring myself to trust in the idea 
that a global feeling for rubbish will arise to save us from what we throw away.  And 
though this is a slightly glib—throwaway, if you will—way of putting things, there 
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is nonetheless a serious point here.  The material turn in contemporary critical 
theory stakes our future on the collective “us” noticing and responding to things, but 
it is by no means clear that this can be relied upon to motivate us to act, much less 
inform us how we should act.  One of Hawkins’s key theoretical touchstones is 
the work of Jane Bennett who, as it happens, opens her book Vibrant Matter with 
an anecdote about rubbish.  Doubtless her remarks are only intended to set the 
scene for her discussion of what she calls vital materialism rather than carry the 
weight of that discussion, but to me it’s precisely the throwaway way she treats 
the problem of rubbish that is the problem.  Bennett writes:
On a sunny Tuesday morning on 4 June in the grate over the storm drain to the Chesa- 
peake Bay in front of Sam’s Bagels on Cold Spring Lane in Baltimore, there was:
one large men’s black plastic work glove
one dense mat of oak pollen
one unblemished dead rat
one white plastic bottle cap
one smooth stick of wood
Glove, pollen, rat, cap, stick.  As I encountered these items, they shimmied back and forth  
between debris and thing—between, on the one hand, stuff to ignore, except insofar  
as it betokened human activity (the workman’s efforts, the litterer’s toss, the rat-poisoner’s  
success), and, on the other hand, stuff that commanded attention in its own right, as 
existents in excess of their association with human meanings, habits or projects.  (4)
She goes on to say that the debris caught her eye in the way it did
because of the contingent tableau that they formed with each other, with the street, 
with the weather that morning, with me.  For had the sun not glinted on the black 
glove, I might not have seen the rat; had the rat not been there, I might not have 
noted the little bottle cap, and so on.  [. . . ] In this assemblage, objects appeared as 
things, that is, as vivid entities not entirely reducible to the contexts in which (human) 
subjects set them [. . .].  (5)
Unfortunately, she does not say anything more here about the nature of the rela- 
tionships between these items and the street, or the weather, or indeed herself, save 
the way they caught her eye.  In point of fact, the only reason she thinks of the items 
as an assemblage is because her glance happened to take them all in at once.  Bennett 
attributes her perception of these objects to a happy combination of her own per- 
ceptual openness and what she calls the “thing power” of the objects themselves.
The somewhat surreal-sounding concept of thing power is said to call “to mind 
a childhood sense of the world as filled with all sorts of animate beings, some human, 
some not, some organic, some not.  It draws attention to an efficacy of objects in 
excess of the human meanings, designs, or purposes they express or serve” (20).  Bennett 
experiences an epiphany of sorts to the effect that, as she puts it, it hit her “in a vis- 
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ceral way how American materialism, which requires buying ever-increasing 
numbers of products purchased in ever shorter cycles, is antimateriality” (5).  This 
idea is echoed in Hawkins’s work.  Hawkins argues that humans consume as 
though their consumption is immaculate and does not produce waste.  We delude 
ourselves into thinking that, when we throw trash in the bin, it is somehow 
thereby “taken care of” and we don’t give a second thought to the eventual resting 
place of that trash.  Not only that, we tend to think of trash “as simply a natural 
outcome of human existence; life inevitably begets rubbish” (Rogers 27).  Therefore 
we are not really obliged to think about it, any more than we think about the many 
other facets of human existence that in the first world (at least) we assume we are 
entitled to and tend to take for granted—the air we breathe, the water we drink, the 
sunshine on our backs, and the ground beneath our feet.  We assume all these 
things will be life-sustaining, but that assumption no longer holds.  The reality is 
that our disregard for what happens to our trash is jeopardizing our existence to the 
point where, as Paul Virilio so memorably puts it: “One day the day will come 
when the day won’t come” (vii).
Bennett’s work raises several questions, besides the question of whether or 
not a contingent tableau can truly constitute an assemblage, which I’ll leave aside. 
To begin with, there is the idea of “thing power” itself, which strikes me as an oddly 
inert conception of power inasmuch as it does little more than call attention to itself, 
and even then only when our perceptual apparatus is properly primed to notice it. 
If thing power depends on perceptual priming, then it is hard to see how one 
can maintain the idea that it is in fact a power.  By the same token, if we only 
notice things because they have thing power, then what must be said of all the 
things that we do not notice?  Are they without thing power?  If so, who decides? 
Is it only in the eye of the beholder?  Can powerless things acquire thing power 
on their own or does it require a perceiving subject to bestow it?  Even if we set 
aside these questions, for which no obvious answer appears to be forthcoming, it 
is still hard to see what actual purpose it serves, in a critical sense, because all it 
seems to do is point in a very conditional way to a process by which we become 
aware of a thing’s existence.  Given this rather banal function it is somewhat sur-
prising to find that, for Bennett, thing power is the central plank in the ethics of 
what she calls vital materialism.  Ethics, she says, begins with “the recognition of 
human participation in a shared, vital materiality.  We are vital materiality and we 
are surrounded by it, though we do not always see it that way.  The ethical task at 
hand here is to cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to become perceptually 
open to it” (Vibrant Matter 14; italics mine).
The ethical significance of the perceptual openness and heightened “awareness” 
of nonhuman vitality that Bennett calls for here is debatable because there is no 
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clear link in her thinking between awareness and action.  But more to the point, and 
this is my real concern, it is hard to see how this could be scaled up to a planet-wide 
action.  As several commentators have pointed out, particularly with respect to 
social media, raising awareness is not by itself either an ethical or political act be-
cause it does not entail any specific form of action.  There can be few people in 
the well-informed first world who are not aware of such major issues as climate 
change and the steady destruction of the earth’s habitats from the Amazon rain-
forest to the deep sea, yet little or nothing is being done or even demanded at a 
geopolitical level to change this situation.  This is not to dismiss the occasional 
victories won against this or that development, whether it is a new coal mine in a 
heritage listed rainforest or a new channel dredged through a delicate estuary, but 
it is to say these campaigns all fall a long way short of the general uprising re-
quired to “change everything.”  Even if one concedes awareness is a necessary pre- 
cursor to action, it is not the same thing as saying it is a sufficient cause of action. 
Interestingly, Bennett herself seems rather unsure of what vital materialism’s ethics 
in fact is because elsewhere in her book she says—in a puzzlingly tentative way— 
that perhaps “the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s 
response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating” (Vibrant 
Matter 37).  This is in many ways far less satisfactory than the original formulation 
because all this amounts to saying is that perhaps one ought to look out for oneself.
The key question, for me, is what does Bennett mean by “participating” when 
she says the “ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s re- 
sponse to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating” (37), because 
it seems to suggest that the assemblage is always somehow pre-given, an existing 
arrangement of things that one enters and responds to like a player in a virtual 
reality game such as Second Life.  Bennett’s political sympathies are clearly refor- 
mist not revolutionary.  She can envisage changing things and upsetting the status 
quo, but not overturning everything and starting again as some more radical en- 
vironmental thinkers, Naomi Klein among them, are beginning to demand.  This 
was made clear in an earlier work, The Enchantment of Modern Life, written a de- 
cade before Vibrant Matter, in which Bennett wrote that she believes that “a mo- 
dified organisation of commodification and advertising could respond to the 
structural injustices in existing patterns of consumption [which she acknowledges 
includes the production of waste] without seeking to eliminate the enchanting 
effects of commodities.  It is the form of commodification, not the fact of it, that 
is problematic” (114).  Her rationale is that commodity capitalism is not the “to- 
talizing power” it is said to be by its critics and defenders alike and that within it 
there is always a positive ethical potential that we can exploit in order to move it 
in a direction more in tune with the needs of environmental sustainability, and 
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what might be termed social justice (115).
The idea that there is such a thing as an ethical form of capitalism is surely 
the most pernicious of all the social and political fantasies circulating today 
because it obscures the most basic of Marx’s lessons, namely that capitalism is in- 
herently exploitative inasmuch as the employers always derive greater benefit from 
labour than the people who perform that labour.  There is no way round this basic 
fact.  Inequality is the engine that drives the machine of capitalism.  And false 
consciousness is what prevents us from seeing this.  To which we must add David 
Harvey’s important insight that significant sections of contemporary capitalism de- 
rives its profits by externalizing its costs—it doesn’t pay either a full or fair price 
for the resource it extracts; it doesn’t pay either a full or fair price for the infra-
structure it relies on for its business (e.g., roads, railway lines, and ports); and it 
certainly doesn’t pay either a full or fair price for the waste it produces, or the en- 
vironmental damage it causes.3  Climate change is seen as the price “we”—i.e., all 
the living creatures who dwell on planet earth—pay for economic prosperity.  These 
are old lessons, to be sure, but as Naomi Klein’s recent writing on climate change 
makes clear, they’re as fresh and as relevant now as they ever were.  As she puts it,
Ours is a culture of disavowal, of simultaneously knowing and not knowing—the 
illusion of proximity coupled with the reality of distance is the trick perfected by the  
fossil-fuelled global market.  So we both know and don’t know who makes our goods,  
who cleans up after us, where our waste disappears to—whether it’s our sewage or elec- 
tronics or our carbon emissions.  (168)
If the ethical task is to respond to the assemblage we are participating in, then that 
surely means we have to start with the assemblage we are all participating in, 
namely the planet as a habitable place.  What does responsibility entail in this 
context?  On big questions like this, vital materialism’s ethics is anaemic, partic-
ularly when compared to more didactic and unforgiving systems such as Kant’s 
“categorical imperatives.”  If things have thing power—why don’t these things 
awaken any ethical feeling of responsibility? Indeed, why don’t they awaken any 
feelings at all?  Awareness is not a feeling.  It may be a precursor to a feeling, 
but by itself it is blank, nothing more than a general preparedness to feel.  One 
can see this clearly in the way Bennett speaks about her awareness of the objects 
encountered on Cold Spring Lane in Baltimore.  Not a little surprisingly, it does 
not awaken feelings of grief or sympathy for the dead rat, which is treated as 
detritus (like all the other objects in her contingent tableau) and evidence of an 
unknown rat poisoner’s success.  But not as a once-living creature whose death is 
3 This is a recurrent theme in his work, but for a succinct explanation of his position see Harvey.
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to be mourned, or at least pitied.  Given that the central goal of vital materialism 
is to perceive the life of all non-human things, including those things which are 
not usually considered to have a life, such as inorganic matter (e.g., bottle caps and 
plastic gloves), it is perhaps to be expected that it would not single out the rat 
as a once-living creature and thereby accord it “special treatment,” but that does 
beg the question: what is the ethical value of the heightened perceptual awareness 
Bennett associates with thing power if it fails to perceive a difference between 
the living and the non-living?
What I find most frustrating in Bennett’s account of her encounter with 
rubbish on Cold Spring Lane in Baltimore, however, is the complete absence of 
any discussion of the ethical implications of the fact that what she encounters is 
perceived as rubbish.  She says nothing about the fact that the items are perceived 
as not only being without any value in themselves, but as having no possible value 
in the future or any possible further use.  They are simply there and one expects 
nothing of them, neither to remain there nor to disappear.  In describing the items 
as debris she explicitly frames them as the by-product of some kind of destruc-
tive episode that drained them of their value.  And though she attempts to recall, 
dimly, some of the processes that might have led the items to being there, she does 
not thereby endow them with value.  They are simply a “heap of fragments” to re- 
call Jameson’s discussion of contemporary art in Postmodernism.  In Jameson’s view, 
art no longer requires us to reimagine the lifeworld of its representations as we did, 
say, in the case of Van Gogh (6-10).  Nowadays art objects are simply there and 
we make sense of them, or not, according to our own lights and not by power of 
our historical imagination.  At the back of this then is Jameson’s diagnosis of the 
contemporary world that it is has forgotten how to think historically.  I am tempted 
to say the same diagnosis can be made here because Bennett’s analysis of the objects 
she encounters displays the same lack of interest in history that Jameson diagnoses 
in postmodern art.  And while she offers an oblique acknowledgement that con-
temporary consumer culture is a frame—in Butler’s sense—in which one has to 
situate any possible discussion of these objects, she does not make the obvious 
connection that as a participant in consumer culture, however conscientiously, 
she is nonetheless a cog in the machine that sustains what she refers to as American 
materialism.
The unasked ethical question here is this: Are we responsible for the rubbish 
we encounter?  Although she doesn’t take up this question herself, Bennett’s vital 
materialist ethics would suggest that we are responsible for the rubbish we encounter. 
However, she does not specify where that responsibility begins and ends.  Although 
Judith Butler’s project is quite different from Bennett’s, I want to suggest that it is 
nonetheless instructive to read their work together here because Butler’s concep-
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tion of ethics also turns on the power of things to capture our attention, but in 
contrast to Bennett she prioritizes the living and she attaches action to awareness. 
She writes:
If certain lives are not perceivable as lives, and this includes sentient beings who are 
not human, then the moral prohibition against violence will be only selectively applied  
(and our own sentience will only be selectively mobilized).  The critique of violence 
must begin with the question of the representability of life itself: what allows a life to 
become visible in its precariousness and its need for shelter, and what is it that keeps 
us from seeing or understanding certain lives in this way?  (Frames of War 51)
Consistent with the vital materialist way of seeing things, Butler’s ethics places the 
onus on the perceived object to awaken in the perceiver the ethical sense of respon- 
sibility and obligation to act.  The difference is that the ethical task for Butler does 
not stop with merely opening oneself to an awareness of nonhuman vitality, but 
also insists that an awareness of any form of vitality must also entail taking on re- 
sponsibility toward that vitality and a general acceptance of the proposition that 
all forms of life are inherently precarious and requiring of our care.  This ethical task 
is thrust upon us, unbidden from a “nameless elsewhere,” interrupting the normal 
course of our lives, binding us to act in spite of ourselves (Precarious Life 130).  Butler’s 
name for this feeling is grief.  But we may generalize and simply say that it is a mode 
of ethics that the world demands of us the moment we perceive that some part of 
it needs us.
This is perhaps the moment to turn to the issue of what advantage there is 
to be had in calling Bennett’s “contingent tableau” an assemblage.  It seems to me 
Bennett’s insistence on the randomness of both the encounter and the things 
encountered functions as an explanation and alibi for the fact that neither the 
encounter nor the things encountered excite any kind of a response from her. 
She is unmoved by the death of the rat and she is uninterested in the source of 
the items she finds with the rat because she does not think of herself as either 
the cause of the objects being where they are or responsible for and before the 
objects that she encounters.  She is willing to acknowledge that her perception 
of the contingent tableau is central to its existence as an assemblage, but not 
that the objects have any claim on her save her attention.  If this is the case, if 
the elements in her assemblage make no claim on her, if they are merely ran-
dom objects randomly encountered, then there is nothing to separate them 
from a heap of fragments.  In other words, it cannot really be considered an as- 
semblage.  The elements in an assemblage are never contingent or purposeless.  This 
is why I have suggested that “arrangement” is better translation of agencement than 
assemblage (Buchanan 383).  It foregrounds more obviously the strong element 
of agency that underpins Deleuze and Guattari’s original conception of the term. 
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We cause our assemblages to be the way they are inasmuch that, if they were ar-
ranged differently, we would not be able to endure them.  The only contingency 
she seems interested in is the one that led her to see the objects, not the more 
consequential set of contingencies that led to them being there in the first place.
The larger point I am trying to make here is that, although we all inhabit a 
planet that is 70 percent ocean, the reality is that except in very precisely defined 
cases it is not part of our lives in any meaningful—i.e., ethical and political—way. 
It is there, we notice it, but noticing it makes no claim on us.  And I’m not con-
vinced that “noticing” is sufficient to compel action.  Indeed, it strikes me that 
we need to return to a Kantian position of doing what we know is right regardless 
of how we feel about it.  We don’t even recognize or give thought to the myriad ways 
in which our everyday activities—showering, washing dishes, laundry, sewage, and 
so on—all impact on the ocean’s health via pipes that lead directly from our homes. 
Nor do we think about, much less act on, the fact that our cars and other fossil 
fuel-powered machines are steadily choking the life out of the ocean by contribut- 
ing to the greenhouse effect which is raising ocean temperatures and acidifying its 
waters.  Every time we place rubbish in the bin we reiterate that our assemblage 
has no place for the environment in it.  And until that way of thinking and acting 
changes, the planet remains in peril and we as its inhabitants continue to live in a 
fantasy world.
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海洋還是大牢？
摘　要
當今世界上的塑膠已多到足以纏繞全球。塑膠的氾濫程度到了科學家聲
稱塑膠已成為新的地質標誌，而海洋又是地球遭受塑膠廢棄物危害最嚴重的地
方。我們所遺棄的終究也會毀滅我們。我們用有毒廢棄物使地球窒息。儘管
海洋遼闊，我們卻視而不見。海洋被當作各種廢棄物傾倒場，海洋正逐步走向
死亡，卻似乎無人能阻止悲劇發生。一部份原因是主權的問題。所有國家都宣
稱海洋的某部分是該國領土之一，但沒有任何國家擁有海洋的全部。現在海洋
出問題了，我們必須追問：誰又該負起解決問題的責任？垃圾問題導致全球暖
化，也就是我們日常生活的所作所為而造成的副產品。我們都期待別人能做出
改變，這樣自己就可以保持不變，但是什麼才能促使真正的改變發生，包括我
們自己？批判理論面對此問題時基本上只有兩種回應：我們不是去做那些我們
知道自己必須做的（此立場的前提是康德的絕對命令），要不就是我們去做
那些我們覺得自己必須做的（在許多方面此立場的前提是班尼特的生命物質
論）。班尼特觀點的擁護者視事物為具體化或物質性的，嚴厲批評了康德觀點
脫離實體或非物質性。康德觀點的侷限在其唯心、過於理想，又因我們必須做
的事並非由我們自行決定而顯得略為專制。必須做的事便是由外部強加在我們
身上，並且時常忽略了歷史或文化的重要性。
關鍵字：裝配、海洋、物質、塑膠、廢棄物、污染
